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Abstract
In this paper, I attempt to to examine the concept of reliability 
in Extended Cognition, using frameworks and data from 
social and evolutionary psychology to examine two of the 
criteria: transparency and endorsement. Using this framework, 
I will argue that the seemingly contradictory experimental 
results in Extended Cognition research are the result of 
ignoring the differences between types of cognitive artefacts 
(active vs. passive) and the higher levels of trust required for 
active artefacts to be considered reliable as a result of our 
ascribing them agency.
Keywords: Extended Cognition; Epistemic Structures; Trust; 
Distributed Cognition; Agency.
Introduction
In their seminal paper “The Extended Mind,” Clark and 
Chalmers   (1998)   put   forward   what   appears   to   be   a 
somewhat radical claim: that cognition is not bound within 
the confines of the skin and skull.  They argue that making 
use  of  cognitive   technologies   as   part   of  the  cognitive 
process produces a powerful, two-way interaction between 
the human and the artefact.   This interaction results in a 
coupled system, such that “all components play an active 
and causal role, and they jointly govern behaviour” (1998). 
As a result of the complex and non-linear interaction, the 
performance and ability of the system as a whole is greater 
than and cannot simply be explained as the simple sum of 
the capabilities of its components. Further, removing any 
component of the coupled system (be it the tool or a neural 
cluster) will cause an overall reduction in the system’s 
competence.  Thus, rather than arbitrarily using the skin as a 
barrier to determine what is part of the cognitive system, 
they   argue   that  reliability  should   be   the   salient 
discriminatory characteristic for what is part of the cognitive 
system and what is not.  They argue that reliability consists 
of three criteria: availability, transparency (automaticity of 
use) and endorsement of the artefact and its content (trust).  
The purpose of this talk is to examine the concept of 
reliability in Extended Cognition, using frameworks and 
data from social and evolutionary psychology to examine 
the   individual   criteria   (save   availability,   which   is 
remarkably straightforward).  Building on this discussion, I 
will   attempt   to   reconcile   seemingly   contradictory 
experimental results in Extended Cognition research.
Simple Cognitive Artefacts
The simplest and most common type of cognitive artefact is 
the epistemic structure (or artefact): a construct made in the 
environment which serves to hold information.  The ability 
to create such structures has evolved in many species, both 
complex and simple, across the spectra of nature.  Many 
insect   species   (including   ants   and   termites)   employ 
pheromone trails to allow them to easily return to a food 
source   or   to   warn   against   danger,   such   as   predators 
(Camazine et al., 2001).  Higher order animals frequently 
use   scents   or   visual   aids   to   mark   trails   within   their 
territories, as well as to lead them back to caches of food 
they have made (Sterelny, 2004).   While these examples 
many   not   be   as   elegant   or   representationally   rich   as 
humanity’s written words, they serve the same purpose. 
They   allow   for   the   offloading   information   from   the 
organism into the environment.   Thus, as Dennett (1996) 
says: “This widespread practice of off-loading releases us 
from the limitations of our animal brains.”
It   is   important   to   note,   however,   that   despite   the 
complexities of language and numerals, even the epistemic 
structures used by humans are often quite simple.  In fact, 
these   simpler   epistemic   structures   are   “everywhere”   in 
human life (Kirsh, 2006).  Many of these structures simply 
serve to ease our memory burden, as when we keep our keys 
near the door or put something that needs to be mailed 
under our keys.  However, we also alter our environment in 
order to convert complex tasks into simpler ones.  Examples 
of this are legion, ranging from the simple act of marking a 
trail to simplify later navigation, to the organization of 
important   notes   into   a   filing   system,   to   the   complex 
behaviour of skilled bartenders who use both the sequence 
and   shape   of   bar   glasses   in   order   to   optimize   their 
performance (Clark, 2001a).  Kirsh & Magilo (1994) call 
such environment-altering behaviour   epistemic actions. 
Using a simple Tetris-player task, they demonstrate not only 
that people perform such actions (despite being literally 
counter-productive in terms of purely pragmatic game-play 
efficiency), but that the number of such actions taken was 
strongly predictive of task performance. In a follow-up 
longitudinal study (Magilo & Kirsh, 1996), it was shown 
that the number of such epistemic actions (and associated 
backtracking) increased with the skill level of individual 
participants, indicating that it was an effective learned 
strategy.  Thus, as Clark (1997) put it, “We use intelligence 
to structure our environment so we can succeed with less 
intelligence. Our brains make the world smart so we can be 
dumb in peace!” (p. 180).    
After more than a decade of study, Kirsh (2006) notes that 
such structures and actions are generated so simply and 
automatically   that   they   often   go   unnoticed   by   both 
researchers and the people making use of them.  As a result, 
he suggests that perhaps the only way to study them is to 
record   a   person’s   behaviour,   and   then   perform   an 
ethnographic analysis after the fact.
703Cognitive Artefacts in a Shared Environment
Sterelny (2004) argues that Clark (and, by extension, other 
proponents of extended cognition) has made a critical error 
in his picture of the  extended  mind and  of epistemic 
artefacts.  Specifically, Clark focusses only on tools being 
used   by   a   single   agent,   whereas   offloaded   epistemic 
structures exist in the shared environment and are often 
themselves shared, and are thus subject to interference. 
Sterelny provides a detailed evolutionary account of the use 
of   tools   and   epistemic   artefacts,   which   stresses   the 
importance of the evolution and use of social guards (tricks 
which we employ in order to protect and validate the data in 
the environment and to detect cheating by members of our 
social group), especially in light of evolutionary pressure to 
get a free ride by making use of the epistemic structures of 
others (or, for that matter, manipulating the structures of 
competitors   or   prey).     He   contrasts   these   with   purely 
internal   resources   that   are   not   exposed   to   outside 
manipulation, and thus do not need to be vetted.  Sterelny 
believes   that   cheater   detection   is   “a   problem   whose 
informational load is both heavy and unpredictable” (2004), 
and therefore argues that, as a result, we have a tension 
between two of the criteria of reliability: transparency and 
endorsement.     The   deployment   of   social   guards   when 
dealing with external resources generates high demands on 
our cognitive economy, increasing attention and processing, 
thus   endangering   the   automatic   endorsement   which   is 
required for an external resource to count as part of the 
mind.  Thus, in order to endorse the content of something, 
its use is no longer automatic.   Sterelny takes this even 
further, arguing that the cognitive costs of coupling are 
higher than the benefits that would be gained.   Sterelny 
(2005) does, however, allow that some social guards may 
themselves be offloaded into the environment (such as our 
ability to recognize our own handwriting).  
In response, Parsell (2006) argues that Sterelny is likely 
overestimating the cost of the use of social guards.  First, 
Parsell demonstrates that a simple connectionist network 
can be created which performs cheater-detection without 
requiring any additional modules, thus showing that the 
processing costs of some types of cheater-detection may be 
trivial.   Furthermore, following Sterelny’s admission that 
the social guard task may itself be partially offloaded, 
Parsell   discusses   the   use   of   passwords   in   modern 
technology, and perhaps more importantly, makes a case 
that the perception of continued possession of an artefact 
creates a (possibly misplaced) strong endorsement of its 
contents, seemingly bypassing or negating the need for 
social guards.  
Chandrasekharan & Stewart (2007) use an evolutionary 
computer model to demonstrate that strategies for use of 
epistemic structures can occur as a result of evolutionary 
pressures,   at   least   in   synthetic   agents.     Further,   they 
demonstrate that the use of epistemic structures not only 
lowers cognitive load (countering Sterelny's concerns about 
the cost being too high), but postulate that this lowering 
could, in fact, drive the generation of additional structures, 
essentially leading to bootstrapping.
Transparency and the Costs of Coupling
Despite the fact that Sterelny’s  hypothesized expensive 
social guards  do not appear to be present, the use of 
cognitive artefacts is not completely without cost.   The 
communication link between agent and artefact is itself an 
information processing task which involves the encoding 
and decoding of information and the activation of the 
perceptual system, at the very least. The act of activating the 
coupling link, however, appears to be nearly automatic:  
“Biological brains ... are by nature open-ended controllers. 
To deal fluently with bodily change and growth, they have 
developed ways of computing, pretty much on a moment-to-
moment basis, what resources are readily available and 
under direct control” (Clark, 2005).
The decision to couple or not is determined by a quick 
cost-benefit analysis of the perceived utility of the artefact 
against the cost of its use, evaluated on a case-by-case basis 
(Lee & Moray, 1992; 1994).  This analysis, however, seems 
to be unbiassed in its selection of which resources to apply 
to a given problem, be they external or internal.  Gray et al. 
(2004; 2006) demonstrated this experimentally by having 
subjects   perform   a   task   with   the   option   of   using   an 
automated   assistant   during   a   simple   cognitive   task: 
programming a simulated VCR.   They conclude that the 
“control system is indifferent to the information source” 
(2006).  What is important is the cost of using the aid, which 
they conclude is simply a function of reaction time, at least 
for this non-critical task.  These data seem intuitive, if one 
considers the task of adding two single-digit numbers.  In 
such a case, the perceived utility of the calculator is so small 
that even if one is close at hand, it is only rarely used - 
whereas people will expend large amounts of effort and 
energy   to   find   a   calculator   when   faced   with   more 
complicated mathematical tasks.
While  activating  a   coupling   link   appears   to   be   an 
automatic task, building that link initially is itself a learned 
behaviour.  There is a cost in time and cognitive resources 
that must be paid in order to integrate a new and novel 
artefact  into our cognitive systems  (Karwowski,  2000). 
Furthermore,   the   cost   of   integration   is   not   fixed,   but 
depends on the complexity of the artefact.  This is the basis 
of Karwowski's Complexity-Incompatibility Principle: “As 
the artifact-human [sic] system complexity increases, the 
compatibility between system elements, expressed through 
their ergonomic interactions at all levels, decreases, leading 
to greater ergonomic entropy of the system.” (2000)  Thus, 
he argues that special care must be taken in the design of 
artefacts in order to assure compatibility with humans.
Sutton (2006) presents a similar view, arguing that much 
of modern human cognition is a result of what he refers to 
as the “soft assembly” of transient and repeatable systems 
involving both internal and external representations and 
resources.   As a result, our neural resources come to be 
“expressly   tailored   to   accommodate   and   exploit   the 
704additional   representational   and   computations   potentials 
introduced” (2006) as we integrate those devices which we 
find to be useful.   This is reinforced by research which 
shows that our plastic minds incorporate tools into the body 
map, and become accustomed to and anticipate the feedback 
these tools provide (Hawkins, 2004).   Thus, true coupling 
occurs   when   we   go   beyond   the   “soft   assembly”   by 
integrating an artefact which we have found to be highly 
reliable and either highly durable or frequently available, 
such that the “new capacities are sufficiently robust and 
enduring as to contribute to the persisting cognitive profile 
of a specific individual” (Sutton, 2006).
Trust and Complex Artefacts
Perceived   utility  of  an  artefact   is an  especially strong 
concept amongst researchers in human-computer interaction 
and the psychology of trust in automation, where it serves as 
the core component (if not the very definition) of trust in 
technology and automation in many frameworks (e.g. Lee & 
Moray, 1992; 1994; Fogg & Tseng, 1999; Dzindolet, Pierce, 
Beck & Dawe, 2002; Riegelsberger, Sasse & McCarthy, 
2005; Kaasinen, 2005).   In this literature, the perceived 
utility is defined as the comparison of the user’s assessment 
of the system’s performance  versus the user’s assessment 
of their own performance, an analysis which is highly 
subject to bias. 
According   to   the   trust   framework   put   forward   by 
Dzindolet,   Pierce,   Beck   &   Dawe   (2002),   disuse   of   a 
cognitive artefact (which is to say, choosing not to use the 
artefact even when it would be appropriate) is a result of 
mistrust   of   the   artefact.     In   their   experiments,   they 
demonstrate   that   users   have   an   initial   expectation   of 
computer superiority (which they call the automation bias), 
however, errors made by the systems are extremely salient. 
Specifically,   people   rated   performance   of   automated 
systems as lower than their own, even when the system 
made less than half as many errors and non-cumulative 
feedback was provided at each trial.  By contrast, subjects 
were more lenient and trusting of “human experts” with the 
same   or   worse   performance   profiles   as   the   automated 
system.  They assert that the automated system is betraying 
our initial trust by making its errors (thus violating our 
expectations),   and   thus   is   quickly   judged   to   be 
untrustworthy.  One simple example that they present is the 
case of automated alarm systems, and what has come to be 
called the  cry wolf  effect.   Essentially, only a few false 
alarms signals are required to greatly degrade trust in the 
system, and, accordingly, response to the alarm.  Dzindolet 
et.   al   also   demonstrate   the   rapid-distrust   effect 
experimentally.     In   this  study,   subjects  were   asked  to 
perform a task, and after each of their responses, they were 
shown the response of an “aide,” which was either described 
as a human expert or a computer program.  At the end of the 
study, subjects were offered a reward based on the accuracy 
of a randomly selected sample of the answers from the 
previous trial, and allowed to have the reward calculated 
based   on   their   own   answers   or   that   of   the   aide. 
Surprisingly, even when told explicitly that the automated 
system made less than half as many errors as they did, 
81.25% of subjects chose to use a selection of their own 
responses rather than those of the automated responses.  By 
comparison, when told that the automated responses were 
actually those of a human expert, 50% of subjects chose to 
use the judgement of the aid.   Thus, they conclude that 
people interact with machines somewhat differently than 
they do with humans. 
Artefacts and Agency
These results stand in contrast with those of Reeves and 
Nass   (1996),   who   demonstrate   that   humans   exhibit 
behaviours with computers similar to their behaviours with 
other humans.  Such examples include attraction to agents 
whose characteristics are most like their own, a greater 
willingness   to   accept   flattery   than   criticism   from   the 
computer, and a less critical approach to the computer 
directly, rather than “behind its back.”   Based on these 
results, Reeves and Nass conclude that human-computer 
interaction is natural and social in nature.
Miller (2004) uses these results to argue that computers 
have bypassed what he refers to as the “agentification 
barrier,” a point where an artefact reaches a sufficient level 
of complexity and autonomy that we ascribe qualities such 
as intent and awareness to it.  Miller demonstrates that this 
difference is so pronounced that we even use different 
language when referring to computers rather than other 
tools: “Even my language, as I write this, is illustrative: I hit 
myself with the hammer, while my computer does things to 
me” (2004).  As a result, Miller claims that humans readily 
generalize their expectations from human-human interaction 
to human-computer interaction regardless of whether or not 
that is the intent of system designers.
Framing Trust
Riegelsberger, Sasse & McCarthy (2005) follow a similar 
track as they lay out what they believe to be a  general 
framework   for   trust,   encompassing   both   human-human 
interaction and human-computer interaction.   They claim 
that the largest difference between trust in technology and 
trust in humans is that, when dealing with automation, the 
primary issue is the trustor’s perception of the trustee’s 
ability, since computers do not have motivation.  However, 
they contend that most technological “agents” are in fact 
part of a larger socio-technological system and should thus 
be analysed using the entire framework.  This is especially 
true, they argue, due to the fact that some users are likely to 
ascribe motivation to the automated agent (as per Miller's 
agentification).  They assert that simple social guards are in 
a constant state of evolution as the guidelines for what 
should   make   an   agent   trustworthy   are   co-opted   by 
untrustworthy actors, thus reducing or eliminating their 
value, as can be shown with the increased complexity of 
internet phishing scams.  Simply increasing the number of 
social guards is also not a viable option, because then the 
burden of trust-testing takes over the entire transaction, 
705causing Sterelny’s argument that the cost of use outweighs 
the usefulness to materialize.   Thus, they argue, while 
trustworthiness   “markers”   do   contribute   to  perceived 
trustworthiness, they are not by themselves sufficient to 
generate trust.  
Thus, beyond simple markers, a trustor must rely on cues 
from the trustee and the environment in order to assess both 
the ability and the motivation of the trustee.  From this, five 
factors of trust are posited, and are split into external and 
intrinsic groups (Riegelsberger, Sasse & McCarthy, 2005). 
External factors are pressures which act to coerce the trustee 
into compliance.  These include temporal embeddedness, or 
the prospect of later retaliation; social embeddedness, or the 
prospect   of   the   trustee’s   reputation;   and  institutional 
embeddedness, which is a combination of the trust in the 
brand associated with the trustee and the trust in the society 
which creates regulations to which they must conform or 
risk punishment.  The intrinsic factors are: ability, which is 
the belief that the trustee is able to perform  the task 
(perceived utility); and  internalized norms, which, in the 
case of technology means dependability – that the system 
will continue to work in the same way over time.  Since the 
external   measures   of   trust   are   used   to   measure   the 
motivation of a trustee, they are less salient when evaluating 
the trustworthiness of an automated agent.   In fact, it is 
unclear   that   an   automated   system   is   embedded   either 
temporally   or   socially.     Institutional   embeddedness, 
however,   does   appear   to   be   a   factor;   sociologists   are 
showing that everyday interactions are increasingly based 
on trust in a brand rather than the individual (Riegelsberger, 
Sasse   &   McCarthy,   2005),   which   creates   an   obvious 
extension to computer-based agents, especially when used 
for commerce.  
Affective Trust
Riegelsberger, Sasse & McCarthy (2005) state that the lack 
of trust in technology can be partially attributed to a lack of 
interpersonal   cues.     Citing   research   by   Rickenburg   & 
Reeves   (2000),   they  show   that   some   cues   lead   to   an 
affective trust even if there is no rational reason for this 
trust.   For example, the use of a synthetic voice or a 
synthetic   animated   character   with   only   very   basic 
interpersonal cues was found to increase trust.  
Schaumburg   (2001),   on   the   other   hand,   argues   that 
trustworthiness does not come as a consequence of painting 
a face onto an agent’s interface.  In fact, he makes the claim 
that in some cases, such an interface may increase the user’s 
anxiety rather than decreasing it, depending on the nature of 
the social interaction and whether or not the user initially 
overestimates the agent’s usefulness.  His claim is based in 
part on a study by Van Mulken, André and Müller (1999) in 
which users did not follow the recommendations of an 
anthropomorphic agent (such as a cartoon character) more 
readily than a non-anthropomorphic one (such as a text or 
audio message), and did not rate it as any more trustworthy. 
It would be interesting to determine if these data differ due 
to purely methodological reasons (since, for instance, audio 
messages were considered anthropomorphic in one study 
but not the other), or if it is a result of differences in the test 
subjects and their levels of exposure to technology.
On   the   opposite   end   of   the   spectrum,   however,   is 
evidence that agents which are intrusive or annoying can 
generate an affective distrust, leading to disuse of the agent. 
As an example, Schaumburg (2000) performed a study of 
Microsoft Office users, showing that not only did subjects 
dislike the Office Assistant (or, as it was more commonly 
known, “Clippy”), but that they actually expressed strong 
negative feelings towards it.  As a result, Clippy was ranked 
as the least efficient way to solve a problem, rejected in the 
context of learning a new application or feature (fewer than 
33% said they would do so, 46% said they would never use 
him), and was only “liked” by 22% of subjects.   Most 
subjects reported that they did not trust Clippy to correctly 
identify their goal or to provide useful assistance. 
Trust vs. Risk
One additional point raised by Riegelsberger, Sasse and 
McCarthy (2005)   in setting out their framework is that 
some researchers have shown that trust is only required in 
situations in which there is risk, although they claim that 
risk   is   hard   to   define.     Generally,   risk   is   measured 
economically, as the product of probability of success and 
gain (or, in cases where losses are likely, inverted cost) 
(Demaree, DeDonno, Burns & Everhart, 2008); however, 
this definition of risk is best applied to systems which are 
deterministic in nature (such as simple gambling tasks). 
Attempting to apply it as a metric in a trust framework 
results in a circular definition, in that it is the trust in the 
system which allows for the estimation of the probability of 
success.   Social psychological measures of risk make use of 
game theory, resulting in a similar circularity.   It does seem 
to follow, however, that risk is a function of the potential 
gains and potential losses of a given action or system, 
regardless  of the actual  form of that function.   Thus, 
Riegelsberger et al.’s (2005) binary view of “risk” or “no 
risk”   can   be   extended,   meaning   that   the   degree   of 
trustworthiness   required   in   any   given   interaction   is 
proportional   to   the   amount   of   risk   the   trustor   must 
undertake.  
In cases of distributed cognition, the trustor is not only 
making   herself   vulnerable   (and   thus,   at   risk)   by   not 
performing   the   entire   task   herself   and   with   her   own 
resources, and thus risking the outcome of this task, but she 
is also potentially wasting valuable cognitive resources and 
time as she learns to integrate the potentially untrustworthy 
artefact into her cognitive system.
Bridging the Gap
The current research about artefact use and coupling is 
highly contradictory.  On the one hand, people appear to 
rapidly and automatically couple with artefacts (e.g. Kirsh, 
2006; Kirsh & Magilo, 1994; Magilo & Kirsh, 1996; Clark, 
1998; 2001a; Sutton 2006), and even to generate epistemic 
artefacts without being aware of doing so.   On the other 
706hand, artefacts appear to be often misused or disused, even 
when the artefact is known to be more accurate (Lee & 
Moray, 1992; 1994; Dzindolet, Pierce, Beck & Dawe, 2002; 
Honeybourne, Sutton & Ward, 2006).   The one point of 
agreement appears to be that some form of trust is required 
in order to create a coupled system; however, as I have 
shown previously, the ease with which that trust can occur 
is debated.  One important distinction appears to have been 
missed in these debates, however: the difference in the very 
nature of the artefacts to which the coupling occurs.
Passive Artefacts
Passive cognitive artefacts, such as epistemic artefacts, are 
ancient and have evolved over time with humanity (Clark, 
2001b),   in   a   sort   of   evolutionary   bootstrapping;   tools 
allowed our forebears to be smarter, which allowed them to 
make   better   tools,   in   the   same   manner   suggested   by 
Chandrasekharan & Stewart (2007). This co-evolutionary 
process has, naturally, also left its mark on us; specifically, 
the availability of tools in our environment to perform the 
hard tasks necessary for success has made adapting to their 
discovery   and   use   a   better   evolutionary   strategy   than 
attempting to overcome problems with our own limited 
resources.   Passive artefacts are the tools that Dennett 
(1996) and Clark (2001a; 2001b) describe when they speak 
of offloading into the environment, both to free up cognitive 
resources and to allow us to reshape problems.
Thus, when dealing with such passive artefacts, Sterelny’s 
hypothesized expensive social guards (Sterelny 2004, 2005) 
do not manifest themselves.  It is unclear, however, if this is 
a result of Parsell’s (2006) claims about the triviality of the 
cost of cheater detection or, if Sterelny was, in fact, correct 
about the high costs of employing social guards.  From an 
evolutionary standpoint, the benefit of acquired behaviours 
needs to outweigh their costs, and so, it may the case that 
the expensive social guards were too complex to have 
evolved.  It may simply be that the benefits of automatically 
endorsing   the   content   of   our   epistemic   artefacts   far 
outweighed the costs of being deceived in a non-obvious 
and thus non-trivially detected way.
As a result of this automatic endorsement, the reliability 
criteria for coupling are met almost trivially,  and thus 
people exhibit the sort of behaviour described by Sutton 
(2006) (and Clark, 1997, 2001a; 2001b; Kirsh & Magilo, 
1994; et cetera), easily extending themselves to passive 
cognitive artefacts.  The ubiquitousness of such artefacts in 
modern culture (notebooks, address books, paper, filing 
cabinets, palm pilots, et cetera) lends credence to this view.
Active Artefacts
Much more recently, however, there has been the creation 
of active cognitive tools: automated and semi-autonomous 
systems which are capable of manipulating representations. 
These   are   the   systems   which   perform   analyses   and 
inferences, that make suggestions, that automate activities, 
and so on.    As per Miller (2004), active tools have crossed 
the “agentification barrier,”, and therefore, we treat them 
like agents, ascribing motivations, awareness and intent to 
these artefacts. These agent-like artefacts are sufficiently 
different from passive artefacts in that they do not induce 
automatic endorsement. Thus, Clark and Chalmers’ (1998) 
concerns  about the difficulty of meeting the reliability 
conditions in agent-agent interactions manifest themselves 
when interacting with active artefacts.   As a result, we 
simply cannot create a coupled system with such an artefact 
until it has earned our trust.  However, this process is made 
difficult by the fact that these artefacts lack many of the 
factors   of   trust   which   are   employed   in   agent-agent 
interactions, such as temporal and social embeddedness and 
are markedly dissimilar from ourselves.  And, of course, the 
amount   of   trust   required   in   any   given   interaction   or 
transaction is a function of the amount of risk undertaken by 
the trustor.
Thus, it is the offered reward (or, more accurately, the 
risk of getting less than the full reward), which explains the 
difference in results between the experiment Dzindolet, 
Pierce, Beck & Dawe (2002), in which people used their 
own judgement over that of an artefact they knew made 
fewer errors, and that of Gray et al. (Gray & Fu, 2004; Gray, 
Sims, Fu & Schoelles, 2006) in which reaction time was the 
only factor in the decision to use the artefact or not.  In the 
latter   case,   the   overall   level   of  task   performance   was 
unimportant to the participants, and thus there was almost 
no risk in employing the artefact. 
Multi-Function and Hybrid Artefacts
It is important to note that in the modern technological age, 
increasingly when discussing an artefact, we refer not to the 
physical device itself, but rather its software. For example, 
to a practiced user there is almost no functional difference 
between a physical or electronic address book.  As such, 
both can be considered to be passive artefacts.  The same 
can be said of many other software packages: electronic 
notepads, rolodexes and the like are all clearly passive 
devices.   However,  the same physical  hardware which 
serves   as   an   address   book   can   also   employ   “active” 
software.
Some   software   artefacts,   however,   such   as   word 
processors, have begun to bridge the gap and act both as 
active and passive.  Whereas older versions of such software 
simply allowed for the suspension of thoughts in linguistic 
form thus freeing us from our working memory limitations, 
newer   ones   alter   the   text   we   type   by   automatically 
correcting spelling and grammar, for instance.  In general, I 
would suggest that such artefacts are true hybrids, and 
treated as such – being automatically trusted in their ability 
to hold our thoughts without being subject to alteration or 
error, while at the same time needing to earn our trust to be 
able to alter (or correct) them.
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